Abstract. Braid group is a very important non-commutative group. It is also an important tool of quantum field theory, and has good topological properties. This paper focuses on the provable security research of cryptosystem over braid group, which consists of two aspects: One, we prove that the Ko's cryptosystem based on braid group is secure against chosen-plaintext-attack(CPA) which proposed in CRYPTO 2000, while it dose not resist active attack. The other is to propose a new public key cryptosystem over braid group which is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext-attack(CCA2 ). Our proofs are based on random oracle models, under the computational conjugacy search assumption(the CCS assumption). This kind of results have never been seen before.
Introduction

Background and related work
In 1994, Shor [2] proposed a quantum fourier transforma algorithm, which can construct an integer factorization polynomial (quantum) algorithm, which poses a substantial threat to the security of RSA. In 2003, Proos et al. [3] extended the Shor algorithm to the elliptic curve, and obtained the polynomial (quantum) algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem over the elliptic curve, which poses a substantial threat to the security of ECC. However, these famous quantum algorithms mainly focus on the exchange structure. For some Cryptosystems based on noncommutative structures [1] [4] [7] [8] ,that attacks are ineffective. Therefore, the design of cryptographic systems over certain non-commutative groups is one of the most important way to find algorithms which can resist quantum attacks. It is the key research object in the field of post quantum cryptography.
The braid group is a very important infinite non-commutative generation group. Because of its many difficult problems and many commutative subgroups, that make it can be used as the carrier of the design of cryptographic systems. The braid group has good algebraic properties, making it a good platform for designing quantum attack algorithms. In 2000, Ko et al proposed a public key cryptosystem based on braid group, after that, there are many papers about the design of the braid cryptosystem in [9] [11] [12] , followed by some questions about the hypothesis of the braid base problem [11] [13] [14] [15] [16] were proposed. However, as far as the existing technology and theory are concerned, the conjugate problem on the braid group is still difficult [18] [19] , that is, there is no polynomial algorithm that can solve the conjugate problem on the braid group in polynomial time, and even in quantum computation, there is no effective algorithm for the conjugate problem at present.
After many years of research and development, people have a deeper understanding of braid cryptology, especially the starting point of the braid group, which greatly promotes the research of cryptographic systems on noncommutative group [36] [37] [38] . On the other hand, there are some fast computation algorithms were proposed [28] [32] [22] [31] , and the implementation of this algorithm has been solved by the center of steven research on algebraic [39] . Recently, there are some digital signature algorithms were proposed, such as WalnutDSA [5] [6] [10] , and others schemes was proposed [20] [21] . These scheme are very attractive. The performance of computing and storage is approaching the need of application.
But so far, the research on the proof security of braid cryptosystems is very rare or even empty, which greatly hinders the delovepment and application of braid cryptosystem. The security of IND-CPA, IND-CCA and IND-CCA2 is enhanced in turn [23] [24] [25] , and the structure of cipher algorithm is becoming more and more complex, and the consumption of computation is also increasing. The early construction of CCA or CCA2 security is realized by the zero knowledge proof method, so the cryptographic algorithm constructed is very practical. In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway [26] proposed a method to prove IND-CCA2 under the random oracle model. The model is concise and is widely recognized and loved by the researchers. Although the security conclusion of the cryptographic algorithm in this model does not fully represent the actual security [26] , it is still the most effective index of security. The ROM model and method are still the main technology of the public key cryptographic security argument. The public key cryptography algorithm based on braid group also uses ROM model to prove security.
Our result
There are more detailed studies on the definition, basic concepts and computational methods of the braid group [27] , this article will not be described here. But the main section is focused on the proof of security of the braid group cryptography algorithm. Our main work is as follows:
1. We have finished the research on the indistinguishability of the braid cryptosystem proposed by Ko [1] , proved that it is IND-CPA through the random oracle model under the computational conjugacy search assumption(the CCS assumption), and we emphasize that it does not have the ability to resist active attack.
2. According to the original EIGamal scheme design idea, we propose a cryptographic algorithm with IND-CPA security under the standard model and the decisional conjugacy search assumpiton(the DCS assumption).
3. Adopting the design idea of hybrid encryption system, we propose a new public key cryptosystem in braid against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Subsequently, its IND-CCA2 security is proved under the random oracle model. Before this paper, there is no any research on the provable secure encryption algorithm on braid group, Our algorithm and proof fill this gap. Like all the provable security analysis procedures, the proof part of this article has taken a lot of space, but its logical process is not very complicated.
Preliminaries
Braid Group
Compared with the general group, the structure of the braid group is more special and complicated. Although the introduction of braid group theory has been very detailed, we still need to spend some words to introduce the basic theories related to it. If the readers need more about braid theory, please refer to literature [27] Definition 1 Define B n as a braid group generated by σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ n−1 , and following the relations:
The string formed by generators in braid group B n is called a braid (or a word), and the number of generators in the string is the length of the braid (or word). It can be clearly seen that the braid group is a class of non commutative generating groups, but there are a large number of commutative elements on it. It is easy to see that there are many commutative subgroups on it. Assume B l+r = {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ l+r−1 }, let LB l = {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ r−1 } be a left subgroup, and RB r = {σ r+1 , σ r+2 , σ r+l−1 } be a right subgroup. So ∀x ∈ LB l , ∀y ∈ RB r , xy = yx This is the basis for computing for building an available key exchange protocol and a cryptographic algorithm.
Definition 2
The fundamental braid is represented by the symbol ∆:
Theorem 1 [28] Every word w in braid can be represented as a canonical form:
n , or the canonical form for short. Of course, there are many standard forms of it. Please refer to the literature [29] [30][32] [33] . For the sake of convenience, this paper adopts the left canonical form.
The literature [1] enumerated 7 hard problems in the braid group, we show that problems related to this paper as follow:
Conjugacy Decision Problem
Instance: (x, y) ∈ B n × B n . Objuctive: Determine whether x and y are conjugate or not.
Conjugacy Search Problem
Instance: (x, y) ∈ B n × B n such that x and y are conjugate.
Objuctive: Find a ∈ B n such that y = axa −1 .
Generalized Conjugacy Search Problem
These hard problems are very useful for the analysis of public key cryptosystems,thus, we will use them to construct the security assumption.
Security Model
The security model is portrayed by Indistinguishability-Game (IND-GAME), mainly divided into three levels: Indistinguishability-Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) [23] , Indistinguishability -(Non Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA) [24] , Indistinguishability -(Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2) [25] . Step1. Initialization The Challenger B generates the password system, and the Adversary A obtains the system public key pk.
Step2. The Adversary A generates plaintext messages and obtains encrypted ciphertext (polynomial bounded).
Step3. Challenge. The Adversary A outputs two messages of the same length, M 0 and M 1 . The Challenger B chooses β ← R {0, 1}, cipher M β , and sends ciphertext C * (Target ciphertext) to A. Step4. Guess. A outputs β ′ , if β ′ = β, return 1, A attack successfully. The advantage of the adversary A can be defined as a function of the parameter K:
For a polynomial time adversary A, there is a negligible function ε(K) that makes Adv
Definition 4 Indistinguishability -(Non Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA) [24] The IND game of public key encryption scheme under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) is as follows [24] Step1. Initialization The Challenger B generates the password system, and the Adversary A obtains the system public key pk.
Step2. Training. A sends the ciphertext C to the B, and B sends the decrypted plaintext to A.(Polynomial bounded)
For a polynomial time adversary A, there is a negligible function ε(K) that makes Adv CCA A (K) ≤ ε(K) set up, it is called IND-CCA security. The above attack is also called 'lunch time attack'. At a 'lunch time', the enemy has a black box that can perform the decryption operation, and the black box can not be used after 'lunch time'.
Definition 5 Indistinguishability -(Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2) [25] The IND game of public key encryption scheme under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is as follows [25] Step1. Initialization The Challenger B generates the password system, and the Adversary A obtains the system public key pk.
Step2. Training1. 
Two Schemes Provably Secure Against Chosen Plaintext Attack
In order to research on the indistinguishable security of public key algorithms over the braid group , we first give the following two assumptions:
The Compution Conjugacy Search Assumption (The CCS Assumption) Given X, Y ∈ B n , X = xgx −1 , Y = ygy −1 , it is hard to compute Z = (xy)g(xy)
The Decisional Conjugacy Search Assumption (The DCS Assumption) Assume that B l+r is a braid group, LB l and RB r are left subgroup and right subgroup, respectively. Assume g, z ← R B l+r , x ← R LB l , y ← R RB r , The following two distributions are computationally non -distinguishable:
We can call the distribution R is Random four tuple while the distribution D is DCS four tuple.
A Scheme Provably Secure Against Chosen Plaintext Attack
Before analyzing Ko. public key cryptosystem [1] , we first propose a non hashing braid group public key cryptosystem, which is very similar to the original ELGamal Scheme [34] .
Algorithm 1 Assume B l+r is a braid group, left subgroup LB l and right subgroup RB r .
KeyGeneration One selects a element g ← R B l+r , x ← R LB l , X = xgx −1 , the public key is (X, g), the private key is (x, g). Encryption The cipher gets a message m ∈ B l+r , one selects a element y ← R RB r , compute Y = ygy 
Theorem 2 If the DCS assumption holds, the algorithm 1 is IN D − CP A.
Proof : Assume a PPT adversary A attack algorithm 1, A outputs M 0 , M 1 , the challenger B chooses β ← R {0, 1}, cipher it and sents the ciphertext to A. A runs an randomization algorithm, outputs the guessing value β. If β ′ = β, A attack successfully, represented by event succ. Note that the advantage of A is
The following constructs an adversary B, B uses A to attack the DCS assumption. Assume B output the tuple T = (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 ), the advatage of B is
The structure of the B is shown as follows:
When return 1, B guesses that the input T is four tuples DCS, else B guesses that the input T is random four tuples. Let R represent events 'T is the random four tuples', D represent events 'T is the DCS four tuples'. Two steps of proof:
When the 'event R' happened, g 4 is a random element in B l+r , so it is independent of the ciphertext C * . Thus, A have no any information of β, he can't guess β with more than 1/2 probability. When B return 1 if and only if A success, so P r[Exp 
P r[Exp
If A attacks B with the non negligible advantage of ε(K), then B attacks the DCS assumption with the same advantage.
The Security of Ko's cryptosystem
In the provable security theory of public key cryptography, the weaker the security assumption is, the more rigorous the results are. Like the DDH assumption and the CDH assumption [35] , The DCS assumption is more stronger than the CCS assumption. So a scheme under the CCS assumption is more security. The following algorithm 2 was proposed by Ko et al. in crypto 2000 [1] .
Algorithm 2 Assume B l+r is a braid group, left subgroup LB l and right subgroup RB r , H ← R {H : B l+r → {0, 1} l(k) } is a hash function.
KeyGeneration One selects a element g ← R B l+r , x ← R LB l , X = xgx −1 , the public key is (X, g), the private key is (x, g). Encryption The cipher gets a message m ∈ B l+r , one selects a element y ← R RB r , computes Y = ygy 
The advantage of A can be define as a function of the security parameter K
B gets (g, X,ĉ 1 ),ĉ 1 is the first component of the target ciphertext. Using the A attacks algorithm 2 as a subprogram, The following steps are taken to calculateŷ,ĉ 1 =ŷgŷ −1 .
1. One chooses a random stringĥ ← R 0, 1 l(k) as a guessing value for H(Ẑ), B don't know theẐ, sents pk = (g, X) to A;
2. H queries (Bounded polynomial times): B build the list H list (Initial empty), element type is (Ẑ i ,ĥ i ), A can query H list any time, B respond as follows:
• IfẐ in H list , respond withĥ in (Ẑ,ĥ).
• Ifĉ 1 =ŷXŷ −1 , respond withĥ , recordẐ =ŷXŷ −1 , save the (Ẑ,ĥ) into list.
• Else, choose random stringĥ ← R {0, 1} l(k) , respond withĥ, recordẐ = yXŷ −1 , save the (Ẑ,ĥ) into list.
Challenge. A outputs two messages
4. After end of above steps, A outputs β ′ , B outputsẐ =ŷXŷ −1 which recorded in step2.
Assume that the event D: In the simulation, H(Ẑ) appears in the list H list .
Assertion 1 B is complete in above simulation process. proof : It is easy to know:
• In the H inquiry of A, each value is answered by random string. In the real attacks of A, the value of the function is generated by the random oracle, so the function value obtained by the A is uniformly distributed;
• For A,ĥ ⊕ M β is a one-time pad system, From the randomness ofĥ, it is known thatĥ ⊕ M β is random for A.
So, Both of the view of A and its view in real attacks are not distinguishable in calculation. 
In summary, if A can take advantage of a non negligible advantage ε(K) to attack algorithm 2, it must exist B whom take Adv Under the current complex network environment, it is entirely possible for the adversary to achieve active attack. Therefore, it is very important for the study of an algorithm with IND-CCA2 security. Next, we will propose a cryptographic algorithm secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack on braid groups.
is a pair of symmetric key algorithms secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, other conditions are the same as Algorithm 1.
KeyGeneration One selects a element g ← R B l+r , x ← R LB l , X = xgx −1 , the public key is (X, g), the private key is (x, g). Encryption The cipher gets a message m ∈ B l+r , one selects a element y ← R RB r , computes Y = ygy
Theorem 4 If H is a random oracle, and the CCS assumption holds, then the algorithm 3 is secure against chosen ciphertext attack.
Proof : Suppose an IND-CCA2's adversary A breaks the algorithm 3 with a not negligible advantage ε(k), then there must be an adversary B attacks the CCS assumption with the advantage of Adv
Assume that A is an IND-CCA2 adversary who attacks algorithm 3, the advantage of A is Adv proof : It is easy to know: • In the H inquiry of A, each value is answered by random string. In the real attack of A, the value of the function is generated by the random oracle, so the function value obtained by the A is uniformly distributed;
• According to the structure of H list , h = H(y), c 1 = ygy −1 , so the decryption response of B is valid.
Thus, both of the view of A and its view in real attacks are not distinguishable in calculation. In summary, if A can take advantage of a non negligible advantage ε(K) win the IND-CCA2 game, then H(Ẑ) appears at least in the probability of 2ε(K) in the H list in above simulation process, B check the elements in H list one by one in step6. So the probability of the success of the adversary B is equal to the event D, thus, B attacks the CCS assumption with the non negligible advantage of 2ε(K) . The algorithm 3 is secure against IN D − CCA2.
Note that In this algorithm, we assume that the symmetric algorithm is IND-CCA2, because its construction method is already very mature. [ 
Conclusion
For the first time, this paper uses a random oracle model to prove that the Ko cryptosystem [1] is IND-CPA security and gives a non-hash public key cryptosystem on braid group, which is very similar to the ElGamal system [34] . Finally, we propose an algorithm on braid group which is secure against chosen of ciphertext attack. This is a mixed encryption algorithm [17] . The keys of the symmetric encryption part is produced by a random oracle. This design gets rid of the bondage of the braid group, and making the algorithm more compatible and more practical. This paper opens the door of the research on the security of the braid cryptosystem, fills the blank of the research direction of provably security in braid cryptosystem, to effectively promote the algorithm to engineering applications, to a certain extent, this article has a pioneering spirit.
